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Introduction
A strength of the law of restitution is that it provides a means to reconsider
existing rights and remedies. One area that restitution lawyers are turning their
attention to, is the recovery of one's money from a third party. Two claims in
particular - the common law claim of'money had and received' and the equitable
claim of 'knowing receipt', are attracting their attention.
Assume that I steal your money and give it to another - the 'third party'.
Through the medium of money had and received you may be able to recover
the value of the money from the third party. The knowing receipt claim also
facilitates the recovery of money from a third party, but in slightly different
circumstances. This is when the'thief' is a trustee, the money is misappropriated
trust money, and the plaintiff is the beneficial owner.
Notwithstanding this general similarity, these claims operate in different ways.
The focus of money had and received is on the third party's receipt of the
plaintiff's money. The third party's knowledge is relevant only for determining
the availability of defences, such as change of position. Subject to defences, a
successful claim culminates in an order that the third party repay the value of
the plaintiff's money actually received.
Turning to the knowing receipt claim, while there is disagreement as to the
state of knowledge that a third party must have, the orthodox view is that
knowledge is a prerequisite. The extent of the third party's potential liability is
also different. A number of successful claims have resulted in an obligation to
repay the value of the trust money so received.1 But this is the minimum liability;
the claim may culminate in the imposition of "the full burdens of trusteeship"2
upon the third party and the punitive remedies associated with defaulting
trustees.
Restitution lawyers are asking 'why are these claims different?' An answer
that Professor Birks has given is, "because of the the immaturity of the law of
restitution".3
Underlying this answer is the belief that knowing receipt is a restitutionary
claim and that the motivation of the courts is to address the otherwise unjust
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enrichment of the knowing recipient.4 This belief appears to be the product of
three influences. First, the recognition by their Lordships in Lipkin Gorman v
Karpnale LimitedS that wh~n money had and received is employed to recover
stolen money from a third party, it is "founded" upon the principle of unjust
enrichment.6
The second influence is the similarity between money had and received and
knowing receipt - both deal with money received by a third party. Indeed, in EI
Ajou v Dollar Holdings PIc Millett Jdescribed knowing rec~iptas "the counterpart
in equity of the common law action for money had and received."7
The third influence is the wish of some restitution lawyers to unify common
law and equity. Professor Birks has gone so far as to suggest that a belief in this
unity is an "article of faith" of restitution lawyers.8
Returning to the belief that knowing receipt is restitutionary, the underlying
assumption appears to be that if money had and received is restitutionary, so
too must knowing receipt be. Proceeding from this assumption, proponents of
a restitutionary rationale suggest that the present differences between knowing
receipt and money had and received constitute an "indefensible inconsistenc[y]"9
which has arisen because, when considering knowing receipt, "neither judges
nor jurists have been able to see a clear view of the nature and the rationale of
the recipient's liability" .10 .
The application of a restitutionary analysis to knowing receipt is intuitively
attractive. Not only does the receipt of the trust money appear to constitute a
clear enrichment but the traditional knowledge requirement (what ever that
may be) appears to show that it is unjust for the knowing recipient to retain the
trust money. Advocates of the restitutionary rationale, however, seek to do more
than just bring this claim within a 'restitution for wrongs' category; they seek to
transform it.'
They believe that the present focus on the recipient's knowledge is misplaced.
A restitutionary rationale apparently demands that liability arise from the receipt
10
The principal academic proponent for this rationale has been Professor Birks,
"Misdirected funds: restitution from the recipient" Idem. See also Harpum, "Knowing
Assistance and Knowing Receipt" in The Frontiers ofLiability Vol 1, (1994), ed P Birks at
17-25; Jones ed, Goffand Jones, The Law ofRestitution (4th ed, 1993) at 673; and Burrows,
The Law of Restitution (1993) 150-156. New Zealand judicial support for this rationale
is provided by Thomas J in Powell v Thompson [1991] 1 NZLR 597 at 607; Blanchard J
in Nimmo v Westpac Banking Corporation [1993] 3 NZLR 218 at 225; and Smellie J in
Equiticorp Industries Group Limited (In Statutory Management) v A-G (High Court,
Auckland, CP No. 2455/89, 12 July 1996) at 245.
[1991] 1 WLR 10.
Ibid at 27 per Lord Goff.
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of trust money, not from the recipient's knowledge. The recipient's knowledge
would be relevant only for determining the availability of defences, such as
change of position. Subject to such defences, the maximum liability would be to
repay the value of the trust money received. ll
The effect of these changes would be that the knowing receipt claim, as we
presently know it, would disappear. Such a transformed claim may be better
renamed the I receipt' claim, for its focus would be upon the receipt of trust money.
In essence, the transformed claim would operate in a fashion similar to money
had and received.
The remainder of this article will question the application of the restitutionary
analysis to knowing receipt. In Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Council of
the London Borough of Islington 12 ("Westdeutsche") Lord Goff comments upon a
growing tension between restitution lawyers and equity lawyers. As his Lordship
observes, the source of this tension is that restitution lawyers perceive that some
equitable institutions have the function of reversing unjust enrichment. The
same lawyers have then sought to embrace these equitable institutions within
the law of restitution, "if necessary moulding them to make them fit for that
purpose". This has raised the fears of equity lawyers that, in this moulding
process, the underlying equitable principles "may become illegitimately
distorted."B It is submitted that a similar process is occurring with knowing
receipt.
Knowing receipt and money had and received may be similar in that the
plaintiff is seeking to recover money from a third party. Nevertheless, their
differences do not constitute an indefensible inconsistency. Rather, they reflect
the different focus of each claim. As shall be seen, the primary use of money
had and received is against the immediate recipient of one's money. Indeed,
cases where it has been successfully used against third parties are rare. In
contrast, knowing receipt was specifically designed to provide relief against third
parties. Differences between the two claims reflect Equity's desire to protect the
otherwise vulnerable equitable interest of the beneficiary while ensuring that
inappropriate liability is not imposed upon innocent third parties.
In Parts II and III of this article respectively, I will provide an overview of the
claims of money had and received and knowing receipt. My focus will be on
the factors that have shaped these claims. Some of these factors are common to
both claims, for instance the function of money. Other factors, however, for
instance the protection of the trust relationship, are unique to one claim - knowing
receipt. This supports my argument that these claims have different functions.
I will also explain how the courts of common lawand equity have responded in
different ways to some of the common policy considerations.
In evaluating the arguments of the advocates for the restitutionary
transformation of knowing receipt, a significant factor is that, in response to its
concern for innocent third parties, Equity has developed two different ways in
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Equity has created sophisticated tracing rules and presumptions that are available
against innocent third party recipients of trust money. To the extent that these
rules and presumptions identify the trust money within the third party's assets,
a court can impose an obligation to transfer the identified property back to the
trust. This form of redress shall be referred to as the "Tracing process" .14 The
significance of the Tracing process is also examined in Part III.
It is because: i) claims against third parties are only a secondary function of
money had and received; ii) different policy considerations have affected these
two claims; and iii) the respective courts have responded differently to similar
policy considerations; that the guidance some seek from money had and received
for the transformation of the knowing receipt claimis unwarranted.
II The Claim For Money Had and Received
1 Overview
Money had and received is an unusual claim. It is the common law's
'workhorse' for the recovery of money, available in a large number of seemingly
different situations. As the learned authors of Goffand Jones The Law ofRestitution
observe:
[Money had and received lies] to recover money which the plaintiff had paid to
the defendant, on the ground that it had been paid under a mistake or compulsion,
or for a consideration which had wholly failed. By this action the plaintiff could
also recover money which the defendant had received from a third party, as when
he was accountable or had attorned to the plaintiff in respect of the money, or the
money formed part of the fruits of an office of the plaintiff which the defendant
had usurped. The action also lay to recover money which the defendant had
acquired from the plaintiff by a tortious act; and, in the very rare cases, where the
[third party] defendant had received money which the plaintiff could identify as
his own at the time of receipt and for which the defendant had not given
consideration, the plaintiff could assert his claim by means of this action. IS
It is the last example with which this article is concerned.
2 Money - items of property, yet, currency
Because money is an integral component of our everyday lives it is easy to
overlook two characteristics that are important in understanding the operation
of money had and received. First, money, manifested as either bank notes or
coins, is an item of property. Indeed, their serial numbers make bank notes
unique items of property. I own the $10.00 bank note, serial number AY072460,
14
IS
There are two aspects to this process. First, the rules dealing with the preservation of
the equitable interest following the transfer of legal title and second, the rules and
presumptions designed to identify the equitable interest in new property derived from
the original trust property. Some commentators regard these two aspects as comprising
different claims. See R P Austin, "Constructive Trusts" from Finn (ed) Essays in Equity
(1985) at 214-5 and M Cope Constructive Trusts (1992) at 380-38l.
Jones ed, Goff and Jones The Law of Restitution, supra n4 at 3.
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which is in my wallet. If I lose this note, or if it is stolen, the finder, or thief, does
not become its owner; it is still mine and through an action for conversion16 or
money had and received, I can assert my ownership.17
Three factors have camouflaged the proprietary nature of money, however.
First, except when a particular bank note or coin has its own special value, for
instance because of its age or rarity, we value it for the "purchasing power in
terms of commodities"18 that it represents. My aim, upon locating the thief of
my $10.00 bank note, is to recover $10.00 of currency; it is immaterial whether it
is 'my' bank note or any other bank notes or coins to the value of $10.00.
The second factor is money's status as currency. Money is an exception to the
general rule of nemo dat quod non habet. The thief cannot acquire legal owne~ship19
of the victim's money, but he or she can confer ownership upon a third party
who acquires possession of the money "fairly and honestly upon a valuable and
bona fide consideration."2o
The third factor is the way in which the common law sometimes provides
relief against infringements of property rights. There is a temptation to associate
such relief with the recovery of one's property in specie but often the relief
provided by the common law is the award of damages. While the resulting
obligation to pay compensation may be vulnerable to the defendant's insolvency,
it survives the loss of the original property.21 This attribute is particularly
important with money, which, because of its role as a medium of exchange,
does not usually remain long in a person's possession. Indeed, recovery of stolen
money would be severely curtailed if it was dependent upon the identification
and return of one's particular bank notes. Since the plaintiff's aim is to recover
a loss of purchasing power, the obligation to pay compensation equivalent to
that purchasing power provides full relief.
Money had and received reflects both the proprietary and currency
characteristics of money. While the claim's availability depends upon evidence
of the defendant's receipt of the plaintiff's money,22 it imposes a 'strict' liability








Miller v Race (1785) 1 Burr. 452, 457-458 per Lord Mansfield; Jones ed, Goff and Jones
The Law of Restitution, ibid at 78 note 33.
Similar legal reasoning applies to coins, but their fungible nature produces additional
evidentiary problems.
Banco de Portugal v Waterlow & Sons [1932] AC 452 per Lord Macmillan at 508.
As against other parties, however, the thief may acquire possessory rights.
Miller v Race, supra n16 at 457-8,401 per Lord Mansfield.
Sir William Holdsworth suggests that it is because.of "their destructible and moveable
character", that the law protects legal interests in chattels through personal remedies.
A History of English Law (1966 Reprint) volume iv at 413.
While it is tempting to equate money with bank notes and coins, the concept of money
(i.e. purchasing power) extends beyond these traditional manifestations. The cheque
provides an early example of the courts' recognition of other manifestations of money.
While a cheque may not enjoy quite the status of a bank note or coin, it performs the
similar function of transferring 'purchasing power' and, as occurs with bank notes
and coins, is valued for the purchasing power that it represents. Confronted with
claims of conversion and money had and received with respect to cheques, the courts
have awarded 'damages' for their' face' value, see Morrison v London County and
Westminister Bank Ltd [1914] 3 KB 356 (CA). Economic reality suggests that the more
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[l]iability depends upon receipt by the defendant of the plaintiff's money and the
extent of the liability depends on the amount received. Since liability depends
upon the receipt, the fact that a recipient has not retained the asset is irrelevant, ...
[nor is] dishonesty or lack of inquiry on the part of the recipient [relevant for the
imposition of liability.F3
Implicit in the reference to the defendant's receipt of the plaintiff's money is
the assumption that the circumstances surrounding the defendant's acquisition
of the money were such so as to preclude the application of the currency exception
to nemo dat. Should the third party acquire possession of the plaintiff's money
"fairly and honestly upon a valuable and bona fide consideration",24 he or she
will have an absolute defence.
3 Claims against Third Parties
Third party recipients of stolen money can be classified into three groups.
The first group are those who, because of the operation of the currency exception,
are protected against the money had and received claim. An example is the
retailer who innocently sells a product to the thief.
The second group is comprised of third parties who do not come within the
currency exception because they did not acquire the money "fairly and
honestly" .25 Members of the third group also are not protected by the currency
exception, not because of their knowledge, but because they were donees.
In determining membership of the second group - those who did not acquire
the money "fairly and honestly", the issue is whether transferees of money are
required, or should be required, to make enquires as to the transferor's title. To
fulfil its function as a means of exchange, money must be able to circulate freely.
It would cease to do so if transferees who had given value, feared the subsequent
imposition of personal liability to repay its value. Significantly, this fear was a
factor in making currency an exception to the nemo dat rule.26
This policy consideration suggests that in arm's length transactions the courts
should not impose a general obligation upon the transferee to make enquires
nor, in the absence of a reckless disregard for the rights of others, impute
knowledge to the defendant.27 Membership of this group, therefore, would
appear to be confined to those third parties who knew that the money did not






modern forms of withdrawals from a bank account, for instance through the medium
of an automatic teller machine or electronic funds transfer, be treated in a similar
fashion.
[1992] 4 All ER 451 at 463.
Miller v Race, supra n16 at 457-8,401 per Lord Mansfield.
Idem.
Idem.
A recent case where money was recovered from a vendor of property is Police v Hutana
[1995] DCR 914. The money, some $4,000, represented proceeds from a bank robbery.
While it had been conceded that Hutana had acquired the money as consideration for
the sale of her car, the Court held that the currency exception to nemo dat did not
apply. Crucial to this conclusion was the Court's willingness to infer that Hutana
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The third group is composed of donees. Given the suggested restricted
membership of the last group, donees should comprise the majority of third
parties potentially facing liability pursuant to money had and received. But is
the imposition of liability to repay the value of money innocently received,
regardless of whether that money has been dissipated, appropriate? Prior to
the recognition of a change of position defence such liability may have been
perceived as inappropriate.
Indeed, successful claims against third parties have been "very rare" .28 A
reason for this has been the evidentiary difficulties confronting the plaintiff.
Not only does the plaintiff have to show that his or her money was received by
an intermediary (for instance a thief) but that the intermediary transferred the
same money to the third party.
One solution to such difficulties is the utilisation of tracing rules and
presumptions. When compared to equity's "modern doctrine" of tracing,29
however, the common law has traditionally taken a conservative approach to
tracing.3o The admixture of the plaintiff's money with money of another, for
example, has been regarded as precluding the ability to trace it. At one time it
was even thought that the common law was unable to follow money out of a
bank account in which it had been the only money deposited, a conservatism
that was laid to rest by the Court of Appeal in Re Diplock.31 It is submitted that





knew the money represented the proceeds of a crime. A significant factor underlying
this inference was the apparent relationship of the purchaser to Hutana; while Hutana
would not name the purchaser - she feared reprisals - she "acknowledge[d]" that he
had criminal convictions and"did not dispute" that he was related to the father of her
children. For that reason the Court considered that the transaction was "in a very
broad sense, an inter-family one and not at arm's length between strangers" (at 917).
Additional factors included the fact that the money was in the form of large
denomination notes and that Hutana did not bank the money for some four months.
Jones ed, Goff and Jones The Law of Restitution, supra n4 at 3. A case in which the
evidentiary problems were overcome is Clarke v Shee and Johnston (1774) 1 Cowp 197;
98 ER 1041. The intermediary was the plaintiff's clerk. In the course of his employment
he received money on behalf of the plaintiff. Instead of accounting for this money, the
clerk used it to purchase lottery tickets from the defendants (the third party). As this
transaction contravened the Lottery Act 1772, the 'value' given by the defendant for
this money was not regarded as constituting consideration. The Court concluded that
"the money and notes which [the clerk] paid to the defendants [were] the identical
notes and money of the plaintiff" (1774) 1 Cowp 197; 98 ER 1041 at 200; 1043 per Lord
Mansfield.
In Re Hallett's Estate (1879) 13 Ch D 696 (CA) at 708 per Jessel MR.
Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M & S 562; 105 ER 721 at 575; 726 per Lord Ellenborough CJ is
regarded as establishing the power of common law courts to trace money. One
interpretation of this case is that the Court seeking the power to trace money simply
adopted the then tracing rules of Equity, see SR Scott, "The Recovery of Money -
Recognising the Potential of the Claim for Money Had and Received" (1994) 8 OLR
239 at 256-8. But see Lionel D Smith, "Tracing in Taylor v Plurner: Equity in the Court
of King's Bench" [1995] LMCLQ 240 for the argument that the defendant's case "was
based on the assertion of equitable proprietary rights in the proceeds of a disposition
by a faithless fiduciary" at 268.
[1948] 1 Ch 465 at 519.
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common law judges that the imposition of strict liability upon third parties (the
majority of whom, one suspects, would be innocent of any wrongdoing) to pay
the value of money received, is inappropriate.
This collective wisdom may underlie an observation of Millett Jin Agip (Africa)
Ltd v]ackson. 32 At issue was whether the common law could trace money that
had been transferred electronically. In concluding that it could not, Millett J
considered that the common law "can only follow a physical asset, such as a
cheque or its proceeds, from one person to another."33 Professor Birks suggested
that this limitation, "is barely intelligible except as part of a[n] ... attack on the
strict common law liability."34
The fear of imposing absolute liability on innocent recipients is further apparent
from the attempt of Millett Jto limit the significance of the decision of the Court
of Appeal in Banque BeIge Pour L'Etranger v Hambrouck. 35 He suggested:
[That case] is no authority for the proposition that [money had and received] lies
against a subsequent transferee who has parted with the money, and I doubt that
it does. At this remove the action begins to take on the aspect of a proprietary
claim rather than the enforcement of a personal right to account. Should it be
sought to impose personal liability on a person who has parted with the money,
recourse can be made to equity, which has developed appropriate principles by
which such liability can be determined. The alternative is to expose an innocent
transferee who has dissipated the money to a claim at law where none would
exist in equity and to make that liability depend on the fortuitous circumstances
that the money had not been mixed with other money prior to its receipt by him.36
Since Millett Jdelivered his judgment in Agip, the fear of imposing strict liability
upon innocent third parties has been addressed with the recognition, by the
House of Lords in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Limited,37 that a change of position
defence may be available to 9- third party recipient of another's money. Indeed,
a motivation for their Lordships' acceptance of a restitutionary rationale for
money had and received may have been the ability which this rationale provided
to I graft' a change of position defence on to the claim. While liability still arises
from the receipt of the plaintiff's money, this defence enables the courts to give
relief to an innocent defendant, "whose position has so changed that it would








Ibid at 398. His Honour reiterated this view in El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings pic,
supra n7 at 733-734.
Birks, "Misdirected Funds: restitution from the recipient", supra n3 at 340.
[1921] 1 KB 321. In that case the rogue, one Hambrouck, defrauded his employer of a
number of cheques which he paid into his own bank account in which, in substance,
no other funds had been paid. From the proceeds Hambrouck paid money to his
mistress who in turn deposited them in her own bank account into which only these
monies were deposited. On discovering the fraud the employer's bank successfully
recovered the funds which remained in the mistress's bank account.
Supra n23 at 400.
Supra n5. See also s 94B Judicature Act 1908 (NZ) for a statutory change of position
defence.
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alternatively to make restitution in full."38
The significance of the change of position defence for claims against third
parties is that courts may now be more willing to find that a third party has
received the plaintiff's money. As Lord Goff observes in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale
Limited, "the recognition of ... [the change of position] defence ... enable[s] a
more generous approach to be taken to the recognition of the right to restitution
[i.e. the imposition of liability]."39 The application of this more generous approach
to the imposition of liability is displayed in that case.
The intermediary, a partner in the plaintiff firm, had used funds from the
plaintiff's client account to finance his gambling. The third party was the
gambling club. A difficulty confronting the plaintiff's claim, however, was that
upon the withdrawal of the money, the intermediary became its legal owner.40
But, if the money legally belonged to the intermediary, how could it also legally
'belong' to the plaintiff so as to provide the necessary foundation for the claim?
Lord Goff considered that the plaintiff did not have to show that the money was
its legal property. This requirement was only"a general rule" .41 Rather, relief
would be available if the plaintiff could establish a basis on which it was entitled
to the money. Here that basis was the original chose in action between the plaintiff
and its bank.42 Lipkin Gorman could trace their interest in the chose in action into
some sort of interest in the money which at that stage legally belonged to the
plaintiff and which he then'gave' to the defendant club.43 Of further interest is
the acceptance by the parties and the Court of factual evidence indicating that
the intermediary must have used funds from the client account to finance his
gambling.
4 Summary
The two dominant characteristics of money had and received are its focus on
the receipt of another's money and, irrespective of the third party's innocence,
the imposition of liability to repay the value of that money. Collectively these
characteristics reflect the proprietary attributes of money, its role as currency,
and the evidentiary problems associated with attempting to identify specific
dealings with money.
The operation of this claim against third parties is tempered, however, by
three general factors, namely, the existence of the currency exception to nelno
dat, the restriction of liability to the amount received,44 and the common law's
conservatism about tracing. It is submitted that these factors reflect a concern
38 Ibid at 34 per Lord Goff.
39 Ibid at 35 per Lord Goff.
40 In reaching this conclusion Lord Goff applied two earlier decisions of the Privy Council:
Union Bank ofAustralia Ltd v McClintock [1922] 1 AC 240 and Conlmercial Banking Co of
Sydney Ltd v Mann [1961] AC 1.
41 Supra n5 at 27.
42 Ibid at 29.
43 A recent case displaying a similar judicial approach in focusing upon the "reality" of
the situation is Agip (Africa) Ltd v Jackson, supra n23: See also Reid v Rigby & Co [1894]
2 QB 40.
44 The ability to trace into substitute products as displayed in Taylor v Plumer supra n30
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about the imposition of liability upon innocent third parties. Indeed, it is only
with the recognition of the change of position defence and an associated apparent
willingness to develop a more generous approach to tracing money, that this
claim may provide an effective means of recourse against third parties.
III The Recovery of Trust Money
1 The Significance of the Trust Relationship
The equitable claim of knowing receipt also provides relief against a third
party recipient of another's money, but it operates differently to that of money
had and received. As noted earlier, notwithstanding disagreement as to the state
of knowledge required of the third party, the orthodox view is that knowledge
is a prerequisite. The claim may also culminate in the imposition of punitive
remedies. But do these differences constitute an "indefensible inconsistenc[y]"
as some suggest?45 It is submitted that the differences are quite defensible. They
are attributable to the trust relationship and the court's balancing of their concern
for innocent third parties with the need to protect the interests of Equity's
"darling"46 - the beneficiary.
The significance attached by Equity to the trust relationship is displayed by
both the extensive duties required of trustees and the punitive remedies imposed
upon trustees who fail to satisfy them. Consider the remedies that are available
against a trustee who misappropriates trust property. Just as a legal owner of
money has a remedy against the thief, the beneficiary has a remedy against the
dishonest trustee. The beneficiary's remedies, however, are not limited to
recovering the value of the stolen money. Rather, through the application of the
accounting remedy, he or she can deprive the trustee of any profit derived through
the use of that money. The beneficiary also enjoys sophisticated tracing rules
and presumptions pursuant to which it may be possible for him or her to trace
the trust money into a new asset and assert either equitable ownership or an
equitable charge over that asset.
This response is attributable to the fact that the trustee, unlike the thief, acquired
the money on the basis that he or she would advance the interests of the
beneficiary. VVhile the settlor may accept (or be deemed to have accepted) the
risk that the trust money may be stolen by a stranger,47 he or she is not regarded
as accepting the risk that the trustee will steal the money.48
suggests that the plaintiff may be able to trace his or her money into an appreciating
asset.
45 Birks "Misdirected funds: restitution from the recipient", supra n3 at 310.
46 Finn, "The Liability of Third Parties for Knowing Receipt or Assistance" in Waters ed,
Equity, Fiduciaries and Trusts (1993) 195 at 197.
47 In which case the trustee, as the legal owner, has remedies against the thief and the
failure to exercise them may constitute a breach of trust.
48 Professor Finn suggests that third party receipt of trust money in situations in which
there is no breach of trust (e.g. a bank combining a trust account with that of a trustee)
is,''generically distinct" from the situation where the money was transferred in breach
of trust. See "The Liability of Third Parties for Knowing Receipt or Assistance", supra
n46 at 209.
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In developing remedies against the trustee that confer preferential recovery
and deprive the trustee of any personal profit, the courts have utilised the flexible
nature of the beneficiary's interest in the trust. For some purposes the
beneficiary's equitable interest can be equated with ownership of specific items
of property. For other purposes, the interest becomes one of ownership of a
fund, the composite parts of which are always changing. Utilising the fiction
that the dish'onest trustee is really honest, the misappropriation of trust money,
and its employment in the acquisition of some other asset, can be transformed
into a mere alteration in the composition of the trust fund. 49
2 The Creation of Rights ofProperty against Third Parties - The Tracing process
Equity's protection of the trust does not stop with the development of extensive
remedies against the trustee. There are also extensive remedies available against
third parties. As Lord Parker observed in Sinclair v Brougham:
Starting from a personal equity, based on the consideration that it would be
unconscionable for anyone who could not plead purchase for value without notice
to retain an advantage derived from the misapplication of trust money, it ended,
as was so often the case, in creating what were in effect rights or property, though
not recognised as such by the common law.50
Regarded by some as an application of the law of priorities,51 the Tracir:tg
process facilitates the survival of an existing equitable interest following the
transfer of legal title to another.52 The starting point is the trustee's ability (as
the legal owner) to transfer legal title to a third party. Assuming that the transfer
is in breach of trust, the issue becomes whether the third party acquires legal
title subject to the existing equitable interest. The general response is that the
transfer of legal title is insufficient to destroy the equitable interest. Unless the





Re Hallett's Estate, supra n29 at 709.
[1914] AC 398 at 441-442.
Austin, "Constructive Trusts", supra n14 at 214-5; Cope Constructive Trusts, supra n14
at 380-1.
As Sir Frederick Jordan observed:
"If a person has acquired a legal title to property, a Court of Equity will not
compel him to hold it for the benefit of another who in fact has a prior equitable
interest in it, unless the person who acquired the legal title did so in such
circumstances that he cannot in good conscience hold it, except subject to the
equitable interest. Hence a purchaser who acquires the legal title for value,
and without notice of any equitable interests, is entitled to hold it free from
any such interests, if they in fact exist Pearce v Bulteel [1916] 2 Ch 544. But
property the legal title to which has been acquired voluntarily must be held
subject to all existing equitable interests, ie interests in the property concerned
Reeves v Poole [1914] 2 KB 284; and even a purchaser for value takes subject to
all equitable interests of which he had notice: Lewin 14th ed p 748; Craddock
Bros v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136 at 158-9."
This observation is reproduced in Meagher Gummow and Lehane, Equity Doctrines &
Remedies (3rd ed 1992) at 250.
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interest, the transferee's legal title is subject to that interest.53
Sinclair v Brougham54 confirms the application of the Tracing process to trust
money. It is significant that the Tracing process, at least as it applies against a
volunteer who does not have notice of the equitable interest,55 does not result in
the imposition of liability to pay for the value of the trust money received. It is
only to the extent that the trust money remains identified that the third party
becomes under an obligation to restore it.56
It was against this general background that Lord Selbourne made his
observation in 'Barnes v Addy57 as to the situations in which a third party can
be.come personally liable to repay the value of the trust money received (but no
longer identifiable).
3 Knowing receipt, Barnes v Addy style
According to Lord Selbourne LC:
Those who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal power and control over the
trust property, imposing on him a corresponding responsibility. That responsibility
may no doubt be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees, if
they are found either making themselves trustees de son tort, or actually
participating in any fraudulent conduct of the trustee to the injury of the cestui que
trust. But, on the other hand, strangers are not to be made constructive trustees
merely because they act as the agents of trustees in transactions within their legal
powers, transactions, perhaps of which a Court of Equity may disapprove, unless
those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property,
or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the







Underlying this response is Equity'S maxim that where there is equal equity the law
must prevail. As explained in AE Randall Storey on Equity 3rd ed (1920) at 36, para
64c:
"[i]f the defendant has a claim to the passive protection of a court of equity,
and his claim is equal to the claim which the plaintiff has to call for the active
aid of the court, in such a case the court will do simply nothing, and he who
has the legal estate will prevail."
Supra n50. See also Re Diplock, supra n31 at 536-537.
Views differ as to the position of third parties with notice of the equitable interest.
Some believe that in the absence of their knowledge of the breach of trust, such parties
attract the same liability as the innocent volunteer. Others, however, believe that the
knowing receipt claim encompasses third parties with notice of the equitable interest.
Sinclair v Brougham, supra n50 at 442-3. See also In re Moiltagu's Settlement Trusts,
supra n2 at 1203 and El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Pic, supra n7 for recent confirmation
of the Tracing process. The ability to trace the trust money into substitute assets means
that if the defendant has used the trust money (and only that money) to acquire another
asset which has subsequently appreciated in value, the Tracing process may result in
recovery in excess of the original trust money received and preferential recovery should
the defendant be insolvent. It may be argued that "justice between the parties"
(O'Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] Ch 428 at 468 per Fox LJ) demands
that the third party should have a claim for an allowance to reflect his or her skill and
labour in preserving the trust property and/ or increasing its value.
(1874) LR 9 Ch App 244.
Ibid at 251-2. While Lord Selbourne was directing his observation as to the liability of
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Prior to his judicial appointment, Professor Finn noted that Lord Selbourne's
observation has one important "virtue" - "[i]ts unequivocal affirmation that the
third party's liability [for knowing receipt] was grounded in participation in a
wrong."59 Indeed, a close reading of Lord Selbourne's observation reveals that
he was considering the situations in which the "responsibility" imposed upon a
trustee is to ~/be extended in equity to others who are not properly trustees."60
Not only does the third party who "receives trust property with notice that it is
trust property which is being transferred in breach of trust" take that property
subject to an equity in favour of the beneficiaries but he or she is subjected to
"the full burden of trusteeship" .61
The result is that in addition to becoming personally liable to repay the value
of the trust money so received, the knowing recipient becomes potentially subject
to the duties and obligations imposed upon an express trustee.62 Further, just as
tracing rules and presumptions can be employed against the express trustee,
they can be employed against the knowing recipient. If the plaintiff can trace
the trust money into a more valuable asset, a constructive trust or equitable lien
will be imposed over that asset. The knowing recipient's personal liability to
repay the value of the trust money so received therefore constitutes the minimum
level of liability. For the purpose of this article, the term I constructive trustee'
will be used to refer to the situation in which the court imposes the full burden
of trusteeship upon the third party. Because of the severity of the associated
duties and obligations, some commentators, for instance Mr Harpum, suggest
that they should not be "lightly imposed" upon a third party.63
4 Differences between knowing receipt and the Tracing process
Until recently Lord Selbourne's observation from Barnes v Addy64 has been







agents, his views concerning knowing receipt and knowing assistance have become
regarded as being of general application.
Finn, "The Liability of Third Parties for Knowing Receipt or Assistance", supra n46 at
205.
Supra n57 at 251.
Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts, supra n2 at 1198 and 1200 respectively per Sir Robert
Megarry V-C. Knowing receipt is also available against a third party who"acquires
[the requisite knowledge] subsequent to such receipt and then deals with the property
in a manner inconsistent with the trust." The claim also applies against trust money
in the third party's possession at the time he or she acquires the requisite knowledge.
Karak Rubber Co. Ltd v Burden (No 2) [1972] 1 WLR 602 at 632-633 per Brightman J, Re
Montagu's Settlement Trusts, supra at 1198, and Westdeutsche , supra n12 at 830.
As Professor Cope observes, the third party's "in personam liability for a breach of
trust is the same as an express trustee, that is the [third party], like a trustee, is liable to
place the trust in the same position as it would have been if no breach had been
committed and matters such as causation, forseeability and remoteness are usually
irrelevant in the calculation of the loss." Cope, Constructive Trusts. supra n14 at 360-
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liability.65 Indeed, for some, the existence of the Tracing process may come as a
surprise. Knowing receipt has gained such prominence that it is easy to assume
that it provides the sole form of redress against a third party recipient of
misappropriated trust money.
The preceding section, however, has discussed and examined the existence of
the Tracing process.66 For those who remain unsure about the independence of
the Tracing process, observations of Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche67
should clarify the position. There it was unsuccessfully argued that the ability
to enforce an equitable interest against the legal owner of the property was
dependent upon the legal owner being a trustee. His Lordship observed:
[It was] contended that where under a pre-existing trust, Bis entitled to an equitable
interest in trust property, if the trust property comes into the hands of a third
party, X (not being a purchaser for value of the legal interest without notice), B is
entitled to enforce his equitable interest against the property in the hands of X
because X is a trustee for B. In my view the third party, X, is not necessarily a
trustee for B: B's equitable right is enforceable against the property in just the
same way as any other specifically enforceable equitable right can be enforced
against a third party. Even if the third party, X, is not aware that what he has
received is trust property B is entitled to assert his title in that property. If X has
the necessary degree of ~l1owledge,X may himself become a constructive trustee
for B on the basis of knowing receipt. ... In re Diplock, Diplock v Wintle [1948] Ch
465, 478; In re Montagu's Settlement [1987] Ch 264. Therefore, innocent receipt of
property by X subject to an existing equitable interest does not by itself make X a
trustee despite the severance of the legal and equitable titles.68
This observation makes a number of important points. Prominent among
them is Lord Browne-Wilkinson's confirmation that an equitable interest may
be enforced against a third party quite independently of the knowing receipt
claim. Significantly, his Lordship also confirms that to become subject to a
knowing receipt claim, the third party must have "the necessary degree of
knowledge", and, that knowing receipt culminates in the third party becoming
a constructive trustee.
A key to understanding the inter-relationship of the Tracing process and
knowing receipt is to realise the different remedies that they may occasion. As
noted earlier, following an application of the Tracing process the liability of the
third party is limited to restoring identified trust property. Knowing receipt,
however, may culminate in a punitive remedy. A source of confusion, however,






As Professor Austin has noted, Lord Selbourne's "direct and forceful style, and [his]
status ... have ensured ... [the] pre-eminence [of his observation] in all subsequent
pronouncements on this subject." Austin, "Constructive Trusts", supra n14 at 201.
Recent judicial recognition of the existence of these two remedies and their different
natures is provided by Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts, supra n2 and Polly Peck
International pIc v Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769.
Supra n12.
Ibid at 830. (His Honour's emphasis.)
JE Martin, Hanbury and Maudsley's Modern Equity (14th ed., 1993) at 71 includes this
situation within the categories of constructive trusts.
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Not surprisingly, such use supports an assumption that the third party becomes
a constructive trustee, and, as such, becomes subject to the fiduciary obligations
associated with trustees and knowing recipients.
The fallacy of this assumption was revealed by Millett Jin Lonhro PIc v Fayed
(No 2)70 and should be laid to rest by an other observation of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson in Westdeutsche. His Lordship reminded lawyers that:
[t]here are many cases where B enjoys rights which, in equity, are enforceable
against the legal owner, A, without A being a trustee. ... Even in cases where the
whole beneficial interest is vested in B [the beneficial owner] and the bare legal
interest is in A, A is not necessarily a trustee?l
As noted above, his Lordship also confirmed that in the context of a successful
Tracing process the third party is not a trustee.72
A further key to understanding the inter-relationship of the Tracing process
and knowing receipt is to follow the application of their different tracing rules
and presumptions. A good starting point is the rules and presumptions applied
against an express trustee. They are more onerous than those applied in the
Tracing process against third parties. An example is the response to the situation
where trust money, in conjunction with other money, has been used to purchase
a depreciating asset. As against the trustee, the beneficiary can assert a charge
and thereby recover the trust money in priority to the trustee. Such preferential
treatment, however, may be unavailable against the third party. As Lord Parker
explained in Sinclair v Brougham:
Suppose ... that the fiduciary agent parts with the money to a third party who
cannot plead purchase for value without notice, and that the third party invests it
with money of his own in the purchase of property. If the third party had notice
that the money was held in a fiduciary capacity, he would be in exactly the same
position as the fiduciary agent, and could not, therefore, assert any interest in the
property until the money misapplied had been refunded. But if he had no such






[1992] 1 WLR 1 at 12. See also Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994] 3 WLR 761
(HL) at 799 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
Supra n12 at 830.
The significance of Westdeutsche, supra n12, for this debate is displayed in Equiticorp
Industries Group Limited (In Statutory Management) v A-G , supra n4. While Smellie J
expressed his personal view that "unjust enrichment is the foundation for recipient
liability" (at 245) and that there is an "attractive logic" to the strict liability proposition
(at 254), he saw no warrant to depart from the views of Lord Browne-Wilkinson as
expressed in Westdeutsche.
Sinclair v·Brougham, supra n50 at 442-443 per Lord Parker. See also Re Diplock, supra
n31 at 524 but this should be compared with the views of Millett Jin Boscawen v Bajwa
[1995] 4 All ER 769 at 779. A high point of the lenient approach conferred upon third
parties is the conclusion in Re Diplock at 546-7 that the Court could not identify trust
money spent in alterations to the third party's hospital.
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5 One more source of confusion
As noted earlier, the distinction between the Tracing process and knowing
receipt has been blurred by the use of the constructive trust in conjunction with
the Tracing process and the resulting assumption of the imposition of a
trusteeship. With Westdeutsche this particular source of confusion has been
addressed. Unfortunately, one major source of potential confusion remains. It
involves the scope of the overlap between the Tracing process and the knowing
receipt claim. An overlap arises because a knowing recipient cannot be a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice of the equitable interest.
But does the converse apply, is everyone who cannot plead bona fide purchase
for value without notice a knowing recipient? If so, the Tracing process would
merge within the ambit of the knowing receipt claim. Such a merger may support
the arguments advanced by advocates of a restitutionary transformation of
knowing receipt. Unfortunately for these advocates, the converse situation does
not apply. As long as a knowledge component remains a requirement of knowing
receipt, that claim cannot operate against third parties who have no knowledge
whatsoever of the trust or its breach. But such third parties, at least those who
are volunteers, come within the operation of the Tracing process and therefore,
to the extent that the trust money can be identified, come under an obligation to
restore it.
While volunteers without notice constitute the core area for the operation of
the Tracing process, there is disagreement about the situation when the third
party, whether he or she is a volunteer or a.purchaser, had notice of the equitable
interest. The disagreement is over whether such 'notice' can constitute
'knowledge' for the purposes of knowing receipt. If so, the result is to draw a
general distinction between volunteers without notice (who are subject to the
Tracing process) and all other third parties who cannot plead bona fide purchaser
for value without notice. This latter group would face liability as knowing
recipients.
While this disagreement may not appear to be directly relevant to the issue of
whether knowing receipt should be transformed into a restitutionary claim, it
plays an important role, albeit a hidden one. In essence, the disagreement centres
upon whether knowing receipt should be a response to dishonest condu'ct or
negligent conduct.74 The concept of notice, or at least its wider aspects, is directed
to the latter.
74 Baden Delvaux and Le Cuit v Societe Gen. de Commerce SA [1992] 4 All ER 161. At 235-6
Peter Gibson Jsuggested that knowledge can comprise anyone of the following five
different mental states:
"(i) actual knowledge; (ii) wilfully shutting one's eyes to the obvious; (iii)
wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest and
reasonable man would make; (iv) knowledge of circumstances which would
indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable man; (v) knowledge of
circumstances which would put an honest and reasonable man on inquiry."
The dispute between supporters of the dishonesty and negligence sub-rationales
pertains to whether the knowing receipt claim should be available against third parties
having either category (iv) or (v) knowledge. For an overview ofthe English cases see
Oakley, "Liability of a Stranger as a Constructive Trustee" in Cope Ed, Equity Issues
and Trends (1995) at 62.
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'Notice' provided the means by which Equity could regulate transactions
involving the transfer of legal interests so as to provide protection for the
otherwise vulnerable equitable interest. This was achieved by imposing a
standard of care upon intending transferees to investigate the transferor's title
so as to ascertain whether it was subject to an equitable interest. The high point
of this requirement of investigation was reached with transactions involving
land.
Not only did the purchaser of land have notice of facts within his or her actual
knowledge but he or she was deemed to have constructive notice of "facts or
deductions which a party is deemed to have acquired by reason of his knowledge
or actual knowledge of other facts".75 In addition, the purchaser was deemed to
have 'imputed' notice of facts or deductions which his or her agent, for instance
a solicitor, had "either received or should have received had [that agent] made
proper inquiries, whether the notice is communicated by [that agent] to his
principal or not."76 As Fry J observed, to satisfy Equity, the purchaser was
required to show that "he took all reasonable care and made inquiry, and that,





Guided by Westpac Banking Corporation v Savin, supra n1, the New Zealand courts,
when considering the liability of banks using deposited funds to reduce their client's
indebtedness to them, appear to accept that, subject to "appropriate caution" with
respect to category (v) knowledge, all five categories of the Baden test are appropriate
(see Lankshear v ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) Limited, Westpac Banking Corporation
v Ancell, and Anderson v Chilton and Bank of New Zealand, supra n1, Marr v Arabco
Traders Ltd (1987) 1 NZBLC 102,732 at 759.). In the banking cases a common theme
has been the bank's level of involvement in its customer's business affairs and
knowledge derived through regular monitoring of the accounts. These cases should
not be regarded as constituting judicial acceptance of negligence as the requisite
standard. As Smellie J recently observed in Equiticorp Industries Group Limited (In
Statutory Management) v A-G, supra n 4 at 242, "[a]ll the endorsements were obiter. ....
Clearly then, in New Zealand, as in England and elsewhere, the debate is not yet
over."
Randall, Story on Equity, supra n52 at 163. While it is tempting to equate a failure to
inquire when put on notice with common law negligence, Mr Harpum has observed
that the required degree of culpability is higher than that associated with negligence.
"The Stranger as Constructive Trustee", supra n62 at 124.
Meagher, Gummow & Lehane, Equity Doctrines & Remedies, supra n52 at 252.
Re Morgan (1881) 18 Ch D 93 at 102. An expansive view of what constitutes 'notice' (in
particular the concept of constructive notice) may be justified when the purchase
involves land but, as Mr Harpum has observed, this approach does not reflect either
the usual standard of a purchaser's inquiry when the subject matter of the purchase is
not land, or the level of inquiry that the courts have required in this situation.
Manchester Trust v Furness: [1'895] 2 QB 539, 545 (CA) is authority that constructive
notice (and presumably imputed notice) does not apply in commercial situations. While
this relaxation has received general acceptance by the courts, some differences in its
implementation have emerged. Some judges have equated 'notice' with actual
knowledge. Eagle Trust PIc v SBC Securities Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 484 at 506-8 per Vinelott
J; Cowan de Groot Properties Ltd v Eagle Trust PIc [1992] 4 All ER 700 at 759-60 per Knox
J. Other judges have advanced a negligence focus - suggesting that in the commercial
context the reasonable person may take less trouble in making enquires as to the
vendor's title. EI Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings PIc supra n7 at 739 per Millett J; and
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Notice of an equitable interest, however, does not preclude a purchaser from
acquiring the legal title free from that interest. Until the 1860s the'overreaching'
process could operate to protect a purchaser who had notice. In the context of
the sale of trust property,' the overreaching process operated as follows. If the
sale was within the trustee's powers and the purchaser could show that the
purchase money was applied pursuant to the trust, or .that he or she was
discharged from having to show that it had been so applied, the equitable interest
in that trust property was deemed to have transferred to the purchase money.
When it is the 'purchaser' who is acquiring trust money, the process operates to
transfer the equitable interest from that money to the property given by the
purchaser in exchange for the money.
While the overreaching process appears to operate as a defence, it presupposes
an obligation upon a purchaser who has notice to see to the application of the
property transferred to the trustee.78 Compliance with this obligation may
provide protection, but failure to do so resulted in the imposition of liability to
make good any loss arising from the trustee's subsequent misappropriation of
the purchase money.79 Subject to many limitations and qualifications, this
obligation ceased with various statutes enabling trustees to give receipts thereby
protecting the purchaser from any subsequent misappropriation of which he or
she was unaware.80
Notwithstanding this statutory relaxation of the notice doctrine, a purchaser
with notice of an existing equitable interest continues to assume the risk that the
trustee is acting in breach of trust. In this situation, to be fully protected the
purchaser must ensure that the property can be discharged from the equitable
interest and that this has occurred.81 Failure to do so means that the equitable
interest remains.
Returning to the knowing receipt claim, the issue is whether a failure
adequately to investigate the title of a transferor of money, or to see to the
application of the property given in consideration for that money, should give






Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc [1995] 1 WLR 978 at 1000-1 per Millett
J.
Randall, Storey on Equity, supra n53 at paras 1124-1135a provides an overview.
Brown, Snell's Principles of Equity (7th ed, 1884) at 105.
Lord St. Leonards' Act 1859 (22 & 23 Viet., c. 35, s 23); Lord Cranworth's Act 1860 (23
& 24 Viet., c 145, s 29); Conveyancing Act 1881 (44 & 45 Viet., c 41, s 36. For the present
New Zealand section see s 19 Trustee Act 1956.
In Jared v Clemants, [1903] 1 Ch 428 (CA) for instance, the purchaser knew that the land
which he was buying was subject to an equitable mortgage and required that it be
discharged. On settlement he received from the vendor's solicitor (who also acted for
the mortgagee) the deed of mortgage together with what purported to be a receipt
signed by the mortgagee. The receipt turned out to be a forgery and the members of
the Court of Appeal unanimously held that the purchaser's legal title was subject to
the equitable mortgage. As Collins MR observed at 431, "if the purchaser chooses to
complete without ascertaining for himself whether the charge has been paid off, he
does so at his own risk."
Some believe that the Tracing process and knowing receipt claim are aimed at different
mischiefs with the result that 'notice' and 'knowledge' respectively are different
concepts. Re Montagu's Settlement Trusts, supra n2 at 1200 and 1204 per Sir Robert
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For the purpose of the wider issue of whether knowing receipt should be
transformed into a restitutionary claim, this disagreement is important. The
equation of knowledge with notice does not directly undermine the proposition
that knowing receipt is a punitive remedy based upon the third party's
knowledge. Nevertheless, enlarging knowing receipt so that it encompasses
negligent behaviour severs the symmetry between the Tracing process and
knowing receipt claim, and the remedies that they give rise to.83
Consider the situation where a failure adequately to investigate the title of a
transferor of money or to see to the application of the property given in
consideration for that money is not equated with knowledge for the purpose of
the knowing receipt claim. The result is that the third party who knows of the
breach of trust is treated more harshly than the third party who just had notice
of the existence of the equitable interest. Put simply, while the third party with
notice may have been careless, he or she (unlike the knowing recipient) has not
been guilty of "conscious impropriety"84.
The result of extending knowing receipt to encompass negligent behaviour is
to impose the punitive remedies associated with a constructive trusteeship upon
a third party who has notice of the existence of the equitable interest (or should
have been aware of it, if he or she had not negligently failed to draw the
appropriate inference). But is such liability appropriate?
Many would think not and, to accommodate this reaction, an immediate
response is to draw back from imposing a constructive trusteeship upon the
'innocent' third party in favour of personal liability to repay the sum received.
It is in this regard that the New Zealand banking cases noted earlier are of interest.
While the courts have held that the banks were knowing recipients, the liability
imposed upon them was just to repay the value of the trust money that they
received.85
But even this level of liability may be regarded as being inappropriate for a
third party who, while"act[ing] honestly ... fail[ed] to draw the obvious inference




Megarry ve, Eagle Trust pIc v SBC Securities Ltd, supra n77 at 497 per Vinelott J.
The principal English judicial proponent of a negligence focus is Millett J, see El Ajou
v Dollar Land Holdings, supra n7 and Boscawen v Bajwa, supra n73 at 779. In El Ajou, his
Honour went so far as to observe that he could not see "how it would be possible to
develop any logical and coherent system of restitution if there were different
requirements in respect of knowledge for the common law claim for money had and
received, the personal clain1 for an account in equity against a knowing recipient and
the equitable proprietary claim [ie the Tracing process]" (at 730). See also Cigna Life
Insurance New Zealand Limited v Westpac Securities Limited [1996] 1 NZLR 80 in which
Greig Jsuggested that dishonesty is not an essential requirement of knowing receipt.
Support for a distinction between careless and dishonest third parties is provided by
Royal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan [1995] 3 All ER 97. While this case concerned the
knowing assistance claim, a claim which has also attracted considerable disagreement
over the nature of the knowledge required to establish liability, the equation of
knowledge with dishonesty would appear to apply equally to knowing receipt.
Ibid at 106 per Lord Nicholls
Supra n1.
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trusting, or for some other reason" .86 Does the utilisation of a change of position
defence then follow? If such developments occur the features that presently
distinguish knowing receipt from money had and received cease to exist.
Such concerns must raise the question, 'is the equation of notice with
knowledge and the introduction of a negligence standard an interim fall back
position for supporters of a restitutionary based transformation of knowing
receipt?' Judicial support for the negligence approach is provided by Millett J.87
But is he being influenced by his belief (as contained in his extra-judicial
writings88) that knowing receipt would be better served by a restitutionary
rationale? As Mr Gardner has observed, his Honour's advancement of the notice
(or negligence) requirement may have been so as to take "him closer to his
preferred position than knowledge would have done."89
The equation of negligent behaviour with the knowledge required to establish
liability for knowing receipt raises other matters of concern. It further blurs the
dividing line between knowing receipt and the Tracing process. In addition, it
also brings the creation of a new hybrid claim imposing personal liability for the
value of trust money received upon third parties who cannot plead bona fide
purchaser for value without notice that much closer. This will include purchasers
and volunteers who, while not dishonest, are deemed to have notice because of
their negligence in not checking the transferor's title. From here it is only a
short step to the application of a restitutionary rationale.
IV Conclusion
In some situations the principle of unjust enrichment provides an attractive and
persuasive rationale for judicial intervention. Notwithstanding its inherent
attractiveness, the principle of unjust enrichment does not provide the rationale
for knowing receipt. The very existence of the Tracing process must make one
question the restitutionary rationale and the associated transformation that some
seek to impose upon knowing receipt. Insofar as the trust money can be identified
within the third party's assets and the third party is not a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice, the Tracing process ensures that the third party recognises
the plaintiff's equitable ownership. In this respect the Tracing process may be
regarded as intuitively applying embryonic restitutionary principles. To the
extent that the third party remains unjustly enriched by the plaintiff's property,
he or she must restore it.
The function of the knowing receipt claim, however, is different to that of the
Tracing process. While some courts appear to have watered down the
consequences of a successful knowing receipt claim by ordering the recovery of
just the value of the money originally received, it is submitted that the dominant
characteristic displayed by this claim is the constructive trusteeship that it may
culminate in. This is just one of the many situations in which the principle of





Eagle Trust pIc v SBC Securities Ltd, supra n77 at 497 per Vinelott J.
EI Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings, supra n7; Boscawen v Bajwa, supra n73 at 779.
Millett, "Tracing the proceeds of Fraud" (1991) 107 LQR 71.
Gardner, "Knowing Assistance and Knowing Receipt: Taking Stock", supra n9 at 87.
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policy of protecting the trust relationship while recognising the potential impact
upon third parties. In such circumstances the issue is which rationale is to be
dominant. Commenting on the developing law of restitution Professor Sutton
has observed:
This is a law of complex undercurrents; its vitality is far from completely expressed
by saying that in all cases that it I depends' upon a principle of unjust enrichment
or is expressive of some generalised right to restitution, as distinct from rights
given under the law of contract, property or torts. The policies applicable to the
prior relationship between the parties (whether as persons who have made a
contract, or contending claimants to property, or confider and confidant) will often
determine the outcome.90
It is submitted that this observation accurately captures the situation. Equity
has developed a hierarchy of remedies for the recovery of misappropriated trust
money from a third party. At one extreme there is the innocent voluntary
recipient. The court's recognition of that party's innocence is reflected by the
imposition of liability, pursuant to the Tracing process, to return the trust money
that remains identifiable. At the other extreme is the third party who knew that
the transfer to him or her was in breach of trust. In this situation the court's
reprehension of the third party's conduct is reflected in the imposition of liability
for the value of the trust money received and the ability to impose the full burdens
of trusteeship. In the middle ground is the bona fide purchaser who, while not
having knowledge of the breach of trust, had notice of the pre-existing equitable
interest. Unlike the knowing third party, the bona fide purchaser with notice has
not been dishonest. He or she should just have made more enquires before
acquiring the money or should, at least, have more fully appreciated the
significance of the information that he or she possessed. Reflecting the bona fide
purchaser's innocence, he or she is treated in the same way as the innocent
voluntary recipient.
While to a degree the principle of unjust enrichment can be perceived operating
within the knowing receipt claim, it is submitted that it does not provide its
raison d'etre.
90 RJ Sutton, "Book Review, The Law of Restitution. Third Edition" [1987] CLJ 509 at
513.
